Brasil - The New Colonialists

According to a recent African Development Bank report, combined public and private financial flows to Africa rose 400% since 2000 and are projected to exceed $200 billion in 2014. Although countries such as France, the UK and US are still the top foreign investors in Africa, China, Brazil, South Africa and others are closing the gap. China alone has invested some $27.7 billion -- almost half of what the BRICS are spending combined.

Brazil's foreign policy elite like to talk up their political solidarity and cultural affinity with Africa. Observers note that Brazilians are more involved there than at any time since the 1960s. In the past decade, Africa became one of Brazil´s fastest growing trade partners. Brazilian trade to the continent expanded from $4.3 billion in 2000 to $28.5 billion in 2013. But what is really driving Brazilian engagement in the region?

Hardly surprising, there are some hard geopolitical and commercial calculations motivating Brazil´s rapprochement with Africa. While publicly advocating a selfless developmental -- or south-south -- project, Brazilian companies have business interests in most of Africa's faster growing economies. And tighter relations with African counterparts also allows Brazil to secure its maritime control and influence over the South Atlantic.

Brazilian engagement in Africa was propelled by President Lula (2003-2010), who traveled on 12 separate occasions to 29 states. No fewer than 19 of the 37 Brazilian embassies operating in Africa opened their doors during the past decade. Likewise, 18 of the 34 African embassies in Brasilia were inaugurated during the same period.

Brazil backed these diplomatic gestures with development muscle. The national development bank, the BNDES, has disbursed roughly $ 2.9 billion to underwrite projects in Africa since

2007. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) are also invested in African countries. ABC grew under Lula and EMBRAPA opened a new office in Ghana in 2006. The creation of a BNDES office in South Africa in late 2013 underlines the importance Brazil attaches to its partnerships there. Brazil's tropical agriculture know-how and bio-ethanol expertise have found willing partners in parts of Africa. EMBRAPA fielded major initiatives in the so-called "cotton 4+Togo" which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad Mali and Togo. Meanwhile, Brazilian companies entered into significant bio-fuel deals in Mozambique, Angola and Nigeria with the idea of also investing in local technical expertise, infrastructure and technology.

At the diplomatic level, Rousseff's decision in 2013 to cancel (or restructure) $900 million worth of debt with 12 African countries did not get the reception she had hoped. Timed to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the African Union and intended to burnish Brazilian credentials and expand trade opportunities (since Brazilian law does not allow new loans or financial assistance with indebted countries), the move was roundly criticized by the left and right for favoring authoritarian and corrupt African economies. The President has since distanced herself from the deal. Brazilian corporations have come under fire for circumventing local laws and other forms of malfeasance. The multinational mining company Vale, already heavily invested in Africa, suffered financial and public relations setbacks over a suspect deal to acquire rights to the Simandou mining concession in Guinea. Other large oil, mining and infrastructure firms are also coming under extra scrutiny.

Brazil's engagement with Africa has historically been driven by oil and gas, mining and infrastructure interests. Companies such as Andrade Gutierrez, Odebrecht, Petrobras and Vale have a sustained presence on the continent. And while these and other firms will loom certainly large in future Brazilian calculations, forward-looking policy makers and investors would do well to explore fast-growing sectors in which Brazil exhibits a comparative advantage. This is not just about enlightened politics toward Africa, but also about sustaining growth and development at home.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-muggah/what-is-brazil-really-doi_b_6413568.html

"A bunch of losers"

As the Brazil World Cup approaches, South Africa reflects upon the legacy of its own hosting of the event.

Nine stadiums  built or renovated for the World Cup to the tune of 10 billion rand - a quarter of the overall budget - all are in the red, unable to attract regular sporting events or concerts. The Nelson Mandela Bay stadium in the decaying industrial city of Port Elizabeth supports the case.

The current tenants of the state-of-the-art 47,000-seat, 2.1 billion rand venue are the Southern Kings, a second-tier rugby side excluded last year from the lucrative Super XV competition that includes teams from Australia and New Zealand. The Port Elizabeth region has also not had a team in the Premier Soccer League (PSL) since 2006, and even if a local side clawed its way into the big time, the turnstiles will not be overworked - the average PSL game attracts crowds of just 7,000. Since it opened its doors before the World Cup, the stadium has been attracting on average just over 300,000 visitors a year, only three times the record 94,700 who turned up on one day at Soccer City to watch the South African Springbok rugby side play New Zealand in 2010. Its annual up-keep costs may be as high as 65 million rand, according to two university studies, but the owners concede that it runs at a loss of 13 million rand a year - a bill that the municipality has to pick up.

The bill for the under-used and loss-making stadiums' up-keep falls on cash-strapped municipalities, a salutary lesson for Brazil, where hundreds of thousands have protested, sometimes violently, against state spending on this year's tournament. The bill for their up-keep falls on cash-strapped municipalities, a salutary lesson for Brazil, where hundreds of thousands have protested, sometimes violently, against state spending on this year's tournament.

Brazil's anti-World Cup movement argues that the $11.7 billion earmarked for Cup-related spending - three times South Africa's budget - would have been better used on hospitals, schools and public transport. Many in South Africa feel the same way.

"If 50 per cent of the collective resources deployed around the World Cup were deployed around these critical issues, I think the country would have made a big, big leap forward," said Achille Mbembe, a social scientist at Johannesburg's Wits University.

 FIFA and the South African Football Association (SAFA) urged people to focus on "non-tangible" benefits such as an improved national team and the rebranding of a country plagued by violent crime. Whereas tourism numbers have risen since the tournament the sporting benefits are debatable. The national soccer team, Bafana Bafana, failed to qualify for the 2014 World Cup and are currently languishing at 65 in the world rankings, having slid from a short-lived post-World Cup high of 38th in 2011. Since 2010, the side has also struggled in the bi-annual African Nations Cup, qualifying for only one tournament by virtue of being the host. The under-20 and under-23 teams have also failed to get in to any major events.  Bafana Bafana manager Gordon Igesund - the 17th coach since South Africa's admission to international football in 1992  got his marching orders as national coach this week after presiding over a string of lackluster performances and goal-less draws that prompted sports minister Fikile Mbalula to brand the side "a bunch of losers".

From here