The Scramble For Africa: A Continuing Narrative

Africa is fast becoming the go-to continent for countries wanting access to the vast and rich resources. But can the countinent harness its potential, negotiate effectively and have the confidence to take charge of its own future, without allowing global financial giants to ride rough-shod over it?

Most historians generally regard the 1884 Berlin Conference as the index point on the scramble for Africa continuum and it is by all means a continuum. The African continent has played host to several dividing interests and a number of proxy wars from the slave trade to outright colonialism and the cold war where countries like Angola were split in two by opposing superpowers.
In 2014 not much is different. There are new faces and new players. The Asian Tigers, having spent the latter half of the last century gaining prominence like many before them, have arrived at African ports eager to see what the motherland has to offer. They are not alone of course. Countries like Turkey and Brazil are also upping their stake on the continent. And then there are the usual suspects – the United States, Russia and the EU, which, on paper, makes a continent with teeming populations seem all the more crowded. But Africans, for better or worse, have always been accommodating.
The continent seems to inspire people to rush towards it in frenzied anticipation – hence the tagline Scramble for Africa. During the slave trade and the age of empire it was the European powers – Great Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium and admittedly even the Arabs. Post-colonialism and independence saw the courting of Russia and the United States. And now, after the fall of communism and the rise of the Asian Tigers, it seems there is a supposed new scramble between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China.
 
THE NUMBERS
 
Since the beginning of the noughties (the years 2000–2010) global foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) region has increased dramatically, from over $33.5 billion to $246.4 billion in 2012 and, according to a 2010 report by Mckinsey & Company, the rate of return on FDI in Africa was higher than any other region in the first decade of the 21st century. Additionally the International Monetary Fund projected what has since become an oft-cited refrain in the international finance and development sector which is that Africa was growing faster than Asia.
China reportedly surpassed America in trade with Africa in 2009 and has since consistently matched its ambition with investment in various projects. The stock of FDI in SSA from the EU, China, Japan and the US grew by nearly five times between 2001 and 2012 from $27.2 billion to about $132.8 billion; growth that was primarily driven by China whose FDI grew at an annual rate of 53 percent compared to 14 percent of the US. This growth in investment is also reflected in Sino-African trade volumes, which have skyrocketed since their tepid numbers in 2000 – Sino-Africa trade hit $198.5 billion in 2012 compared to 108.9 billion between the US and Africa. Standard Charted estimates that trade between China and Africa will hit $385 billion in 2015.
In all this it is noteworthy that the EU, Africa’s traditional trading partner, still retains the highest volume of trade, doubling its volume of trade inside the last decade and recording over $200 billion in trade in 2013. Given its colonial history the United Kingdom was the clear leader, totalling 104 projects in the SSA region.
 
CHINA 2 AMERICA 1: IS ANYONE REALLY COUNTING?
 
From all relevant data available it would seem China has made inroads into the continent and are in pole position to benefit from their relationships and investments and while there is no agreed final figure on the sum of direct investments in Africa, it is estimated anywhere between $20 billion and $40 billion at any point. On record is the fact that China is now Africa’s top business partner with trade exceeding $166 billion. It is anticipated that China will continue to further its interest on the continent as it expands its presence on the world stage, moving comfortably into the role of superpower it has long been destined for.
The US has recently seen a decline in trade, which many have attributed to the near collapse of financial markets and the economy in the twilight years of the last decade along with a foreign policy that has shifted to resetting relations with Russia, ending wars and conflicts in the Middle East and courting Asia.
The two sides have also cast suspicion on the other motives. America labels China’s interest on the continent as neo-colonialist and China accuses America of double-standards and neglect; all reminiscent of two suitors quick to point out the other’s flaws, while ignoring the flaws in themselves.
 
IT IS THE ECONOMY. STUPID.
 
Noticing China’s growing influence some African countries have taken protectionist stances, as is their right. Whereas some like Nigeria and South Africa, who have benefitted from the Chinese largesse and who have been guilty of the same behaviour in some African countries, have increased the rhetoric against their once benevolent Asian counterparts.
This speaks to an assumed and convenient naiveté that Africans employ whenever the world system doesn’t work to their advantage – the Chinese are not coming to Africa because they are enthralled by our landscapes, warm personalities and wildlife, they come to Africa because we have something they want and that must be our entry point in all negotiations: what can we get back in return and at what cost?
We haven’t been very successful in the past at stopping those who arrived at our ports looking to take advantage, now we are in better control of the relationships and as such we should move to several points of realisation, some of which are that Africa does not need benevolence; we need development.
The Chinese are the latest in a long line of explorers who have reached the hinterland and they won’t be the last. However, what matters is Africa remains in control of that relationship and there are encouraging signs that that is beginning to happen. In South Sudan a Chinese citizen was expelled in connection with alleged misappropriation; Congo kicked out two rogue commodity traders and Algerian courts have banned two Chinese firms from participating in a public tender.
One can only hope that such circumspection and swift movement will be applied to erring and corrupt indigenous officials but that is another topic.
 
A LITTLE PERSPECTIVE
 
In all this talk of a Sino-American scramble for Africa commentators often neglect to mention the paltry one percent and 3.4 percent of the total percentage of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) by the US and China respectively; numbers that barely constitute a skip let alone a scramble for Africa.
This adheres to a basic truth that many Afro-optimists have known for a while that, despite our natural resources and in spite of all the aid sent our way, Africa must own its own development process, it must set its own standards and find the most efficient way to marshal its own resources.
No matter their best intentions, no matter the depth of their forays, the Americans, the Chinese, the Japanese, Martians from Mars, the host of heavens cannot do this for us. The scramble for Africa, such as it is, may never really end but it is about time the search for African solutions began.
 
by Babatunde (Tundé) Oyateru from here with links

Fifty Years On The Colonised Kenyans' Struggles Continue

The 1200 acres of Twiga Farm lie in the heart of Kenya in Kiambu County, northeast of Nairobi. The area, with its green hills and fertile fields, first attracted land grabbers in the form of white settlers during the colonial regime. The Kikuyu, who had lived and cultivated these lands for centuries were forcibly reduced to being workers on the white farms. The British established a property registration system that individualized and commercialized land - contradictory to the Kikuyu tradition of sharing and valuing land. Most Africans had no access to or representation in this system, and so no means to protect their land. The legacy of this system is still being felt in many of the disputes over land seen since independence. 

In 1963, the year of independence, the Kenyan government took a loan from the British government to buy back their land from the colonialist. By then Kenya was well set on its capitalist path and the largest chunks of land went to the new Kenyan political elite, who had the resources and power to buy it. It is no coincidence that the current president, Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the first president Jomo Kenyatta - himself a Kikuyu - is believed to own the largest parcels Kenya's privately held land today. Other Kikuyu, who were the largest group that were dispossessed, were relocated to other areas of the country. This seemed to work until 1992, when the end of the Cold War prompted the spread of neo-liberal democracy through an influx of conditional aid money combined with national demand for democracy.

In the first multiparty election since 1964, the political elite fomented issues over land to rally support along ethnic lines. The results were instances of Post- Election Violence since 1992 with the worst happening in 2007/2008. The clashes, however, produced Internally Displaced People, who fled their lands and the mismanagement in resettling them or rather in addressing the malfunction and injustice of the land tenure system caused further tension. Lastly, the era of investment has fully set root in Kenya, causing legal and illegal evictions, as land becomes lucrative to national and international elites to extract resources and other investment projects. Yet, citizens have been convinced to believe that land issues are a matter of scarcity and rivalries between communities, rather than as a result of land grab by national and foreign elites, companies or as part of skewed 'development schemes'.

The case of Twiga Farm can be understood against this background. After Kenya got its independence, the British settler who 'owned' the land in the colonial system, gave it back to the people who had worked for him instead of paying out their retirement funds. The people of Twiga divided the land among them, built a school and a dispensary, and made a little town. The farm was even allocated a voting station since 1964- a sign that it was recognized as a legitimate community. However, Twiga Farm residents were never issued with modern title deeds. This was not unusual at the time and indeed is the case for many communities, especially those whose land was not seized under colonialism as it was a long way from the capital city, or not particularly fertile. 

It is especially these communities that are in danger of land grabs today, as new technology (e.g. in oil exploration) has made their lands lucrative for investment. The thousands of acres fertile land on Twiga Farm worth billions of Kenyan Shillings (millions of dollars) were bound to attract the interest of other forces. 

In 2004, the company Mboi Kamiti claimed ownership over the land. The police threatened residents with eviction, but they responded by taking the case to court and the chief magistrate ruled in their favour declaring the residents as legal owners by right of adverse occupation. The company, however, did not give up. They went back to court in 2012, ready to dispute the original ruling, but their connections in political ranks seemed to have spared them the bothersome process. On December 20 2012 residents of Kiambu were surprised by bullets flying over their heads and bulldozers demolishing their houses. Eyewitnesses report planes flying over the maize fields, spraying bullets. Four people were shot that day and close to 4000 families displaced. The Provincial Commissioner, the local mayor and police officials at scene accused the residents of having illegally built on the land to justify the evictions. Within 6 hours of the eviction, the police themselves built a police station out of trailers and iron tents on the property. Many of the displaced people were elderly; people who have been born on the land and cultivated it their whole lives. In the course of a single day, they and their families were ejected, and robbed of shelter and livelihood. Some were forced to set up camps by the roadside, and are still there today. 

In a global neo-liberal framework that demands pro-corporation, pro-profit development lead by investments, they are only one example of the massive land grabs and evictions taking place in Kenya and in Africa. The collusion of local, national and international money and power is more and more legalizing the disowning of people of their lands in the name of economic growth, development or investment. 

the whole can be found here

In a global neo-liberal framework that demands pro- corporation, pro- profit development lead by investments, they are only one example of the massive land grabs and evictions taking place in Kenya and in Africa. The collusion of local, national and international money and power is more and more legalizing the disowning of people of their lands in the name of economic growth, development or investment. It is a powerful partnership to stand up against. - See more at: http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/24039#sthash.ofj3wdGA.dpuf

Post-Colonial Africa - The Legacy

Southern Sudanese swapped the battlefield for the ballot box two-and-a-half years ago, when they voted overwhelmingly to sever their ties with Sudan. On July 9th 2011, jubilant street parties in the capital city of Juba marked the creation of the world’s newest sovereign state. But beyond South Sudan’s freshly drawn borders, some members of the international community were worried. The secession, they said, could spur on the dozens of other separatist movements in Africa. They feared that it set a precedent that would threaten the integrity of territorial borders across the continent.

Post-colonial Africa has a long history of separatist movements: a predicament that dates back to 19th-century Europe. When colonial leaders met in Berlin in 1884 to parcel out the “dark continent” among themselves, they did so with scant consideration for divisions of language, religion or ethnicity that already existed here.
Then when independence came to most African countries in the 1960s, the continent’s new leaders agreed to stick to these borders. Maintaining the status quo would have been in their interest for many reasons but mostly because it provided a way to prevent potentially damaging conflicts from erupting among themselves.
Since then, Africa’s borders have remained largely unchanged. Aside from Namibia and South Sudan, the only other country in Africa that has won legal autonomy since colonial independence is Eritrea, which after a long and bloody war seceded from Ethiopia in 1993.

During the same period, in other parts of the world, many apparently immutable boundaries have been challenged and changed. Since 1990 especially, more than 30 new countries have been created around the world, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Balkan conflict led to the formation of new states that reflect ethnic, linguistic and nationalist divisions. Yet the map of Africa remains one drawn up by foreigners, ignorant of extant ethnic and religious realities.
As democracy becomes more widespread in Africa and a new mood of self-determination swells, the insistence on sticking to colonial borders is facing growing popular challenge. Across the continent, dozens of governments are struggling against rebel groups demanding either greater autonomy or full independence.

“The old understanding of ‘Do not change the colonial boundaries’ is over, in terms of people trying to find ways to govern their countries,” says Annette Weber, head of Middle East and Africa research at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). “And some of the countries, in their current boundaries, just don’t make sense.” She points as one example to Nigeria, a nation that is divided between religiously distinct Muslim and Christian populations along a clear north-south fault line.
Continued dissatisfaction with government leadership exacerbates the problem, she says. “What we have seen in Africa is a lot of centralised states where the leader is running the capital but not really reaching out to the periphery. The state is so distant that it doesn’t feature in the life of those populations.” These marginalised people, she explains, often feel that they would be better off with “one identity-based territory that binds them. Independence becomes a hope or an expectation for them.”

The Guardian newspaper in 2012 drew up a map of separatist factions in Africa showing their various aims and claims. The map was strewn with movements, which span the continent from the Casamance region in southern Senegal to the Uamsho Islamists (the Association for Islamic Mobilisation and Propagation) fighting for independence on the already semi-autonomous Tanzanian island of Zanzibar.
The deteriorating political situation in Zanzibar is of growing concern to the Tanzanian government for several reasons. Since 2012, the tactics employed by Uamsho have become increasingly violent, causing fatal clashes with local police and simultaneously jeopardising Tanzania’s reputation for political stability. This is portentous economically since the Indian Ocean island relies heavily on revenue from tourists, who flock to its pristine beaches.
Kenya’s coastal region, similarly reliant on tourists for revenue streams, has also been the target of attacks allegedly committed by a separatist group—the Mombasa Republican Council, which demands independence from the country’s mainland.

The case of the Bakassi peninsula in the Atlantic Gulf of Guinea illustrates the power colonial boundaries still hold. Nigeria had been administering the tiny oil-rich province since independence in 1960. In 2002, the UN’s International Court of Justice ruled that, according to the ageing European colonial maps supplied by both nations in their bid for ownership of the territory, Bakassi should belong to Cameroon. Four years later Nigeria formally handed over the disputed peninsula to neighbouring Cameroon.
The government in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, said that by following the ruling it was respecting international law, but many people in the Bakassi region were outraged, making it clear that they considered Nigeria their home. Last year, a decade after the ruling, a declaration of independence (made from a radio-station tower on a tiny island off the peninsula’s coast) by the Bakassi Movement for Self-Determination, drew brutal reprisals from the Cameroonian military.

These conflicts are by no means restricted to sub-Saharan states. Algeria, for example, faces similar issues. Berber tribes in the northern region of Kabylie have long agitated for greater autonomy from the mainland. This is an underdeveloped territory, where water and power supplies are dire, dissatisfaction is high, and insecurity rife. In January 2013, two security guards were killed in an al-Qaeda-linked attack on a gas pipeline 120km southwest of Algiers.
Many of the ethnic Kabylie have boycotted Algerian politics in recent years and advocate for greater autonomy under a system that would recognise their identity and allow them greater control over oil and gas revenues, while remaining part of Algeria.

The list of these conflicts goes on and on: from Sudan to Western Sahara, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Mali. Unsurprisingly, this is not a situation that African governments are taking lightly. In Zambia, for example, more than 70 separatists demanding independence for Barotseland state in the impoverished Western Province were recently arrested and are currently on trial for treason.
When Zambia’s vice-president, Guy Scott, spoke to Africa in Fact about the arrests and trial, he echoed the sentiments of officials across the continent. “When the Tamil Tigers first started in Sri Lanka, we all thought they were just a bunch of second-rate intellectuals, and look how much damage resulted,” he says, referring to the independence movement that took Sri Lanka into a civil war in the early 1980s. “I think it is dangerous to underestimate these things. We’ve been taking it quite seriously.”
While the dissatisfaction stems from lack of economic opportunity among populations seeking greater control over their natural resources, the government’s patience is limited.
“You can have sympathy, but I don’t think it’s helpful at this point,” he says. “They set up the Barotseland Liberation Army, for example, and that’s not helpful, even if it is only five guys with a penknife between them. There is certainly no majority of people who want to separate from Zambia. The rebels are young men mostly and what they want is a job and money and education and food.”
In a bid to quell the movement, Zambia’s ruling Patriotic Front party announced a revenue-sharing plan in 2012 that will use copper incomes to try to foster development and reduce poverty in the region. But, where necessary, the police will continue to make arrests. “I think the crackdown continues,” Mr Scott says, “and it will until there are no issues to be attended to.”

Whether any of these movements, even if successful, is likely win legal independence is another question altogether. The experience of Somaliland, a tiny breakaway state in the Horn of Africa, shows that neither local governments nor the AU are keen to see the continent further divided. “The AU is overwhelmed by fear that all the other small separatist entities might try to become independent,” argues Ms Weber. “They are worried [that recognising Somaliland] could set off a wave where we would not see an end or a viable solution, so they are quite cautious in taking the next step after South Sudan. I don’t see the reality of the separation going through in the near future,” she says.

This is a warning that could apply to any other independence movement across the continent.
And even if Somaliland wins legal recognition, the experiences of Eritrea and South Sudan are proof enough that secession does not necessarily equal political or economic success.
Since its independence, Eritrea has disputed its borders, fought another war with Ethiopia and clashed with troops from Djibouti. Its tiny economy is growing at a fair pace. But the UN and NGOs accuse the single-party state of brutal repression, including extra-judicial killings and political detentions.

In its two-and-a-half years of independence, South Sudan has bickered with Sudan over its rights to oil-export infrastructure, crippled its economy by closing crude production, and warred over disputed borders in the oil-rich Abyei region. Neither looks much like a developmental success story.
The experience of these governments, born of failed leadership in mother states, provides a valuable lesson. “What is often overlooked is where these states come from,” Ms Weber explains. “Where did South Sudan’s new government learn the business of statehood? They learned it from Khartoum. And many systemic problems of neglect and exclusion that we see from the government of Khartoum are now replicated in South Sudan.

“Often separation results in a duplication of another failed elite, without [an] understanding of what it is to be a government and to be responsible and to represent the interests of the population. That’s not a viable option,” she adds.
In Ethiopia, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an independence movement established in 1973, appears to have come to terms with those constraints. In 2012, it surprised observers by dropping its long-held demands for secession, with spokesmen saying they would now work within the political system “to struggle for freedom in consort with all democratic forces”.

Thus fears of a domino effect emanating from South Sudan’s messy transition were probably overblown. But the persistence of independence groups reflects a bigger and more concerning trend: the failure of leaders to deliver change. “I think there will be more separatist groups calling for separation because they believe it could solve their problem of neglect, but not necessarily because South Sudan set a precedent,” Ms Weber argues.

If governments on the continent fail to address the root causes of discontent—by providing more and better services, and helping to pull people out of poverty—they can expect separatist movements to stir up unrest for years to come.

 From here