In Rwanda in 1994 hundreds of desperate Tutsis sought refuge
on the first day of the genocide at a school where 90 UN troops. The UN flag
flew over the school. The Belgian peacekeepers were armed with a machine gun,
planted at the entrance. The peacekeepers were ordered to abandon the school in
order to escort foreigners to the airport and out of Rwanda. As the soldiers
left, Tutsis begged to be shot rather than left to the militia’s machetes.
Within hours, the 2,000 people at the school were murdered by gun, grenade and
blade.
A year later, Dutch peacekeepers failed to stop the massacre
of 8,000 Muslim men in Srebrenica, a supposedly UN “safe area”, the most
notorious mass killing by the Serbs in Bosnia.
Around the same time-frame, there was the debacle in Somalia
where a US-led UN humanitarian operation turned into a bloody conflict against
a powerful warlord. Angola was at war after its UN peacekeeping mission
collapsed amid accusations it contributed to the breakdown of peace.
Other disasters – the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), Sierra Leone –happened even as the UN peacekeeping department’s budget
doubled and doubled again with growing numbers of missions. In 2000, British
forces landed in Sierra Leone after UN peacekeepers stood aside or fled an
advance on the country’s capital, Freetown, by a notoriously brutal rebel
group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Several hundred peacekeepers
surrendered to the rebels.
Two decades down the line and peacekeeping has ballooned to
become by far the most expensive of UN departments (in 2015 it will cost nearly
$9bn to keep 120,000 blue helmet soldiers and policemen deployed in 16
countries from Mali to Cyprus and Haiti, compared with just $500m at the end of
the cold war). Today, UN troop deployments in the DRC, Sudan and Darfur each
cost more than $1bn a year, with Mali and Central African Republic not far
behind. The most expensive outside Africa is Haiti, with a budget of $500m.
“We’ve got more troops, we’ve got a bigger budget, we
deployed in all sorts of very very difficult places, much more difficult than
we’ve ever been, and we’re stretched, we’re really stretched,” explained JackChristofides, who is on leave from the UN as director of peacekeeping
operations for central and west Africa “If you think of the old deployments in
places like Lebanon and Bosnia, there is a certain infrastructure you could use
and work with. The troops coming were generally from countries that had the
means to launch expeditions. Today, when you’re talking about northern Mali and
central Africa, you have both extremely dangerous conditions and geostrategic
locations which are very difficult to get to.”
Most western nations will not put boots on the ground as frontline
peacekeepers and so the UN is dependent on the goodwill of those countries
prepared to deploy troops such as India, Bangladesh, Rwanda and Nigeria, making
it hard to assert its authority. Obama is jointly hosting a summit with Ban in
New York later this month to seek commitments to strengthen peacekeeping with
better trained troops, equipment and intelligence resources. Moreover, if other
countries are sending their forces then the US does not have to risk the lives
of American soldiers. Previously, the US mostly regarded peacekeeping in
Africa, in particular, as a humanitarian issue. Now, given the nature of the
conflicts in Mali, Nigeria and Central African Republic, Washington views it as
strategic. But while the US wants more assertive peacekeeping, it does not want
to send its soldiers to fight. Obama is pressing more developed countries, in
Europe, Asia and Latin America, to make greater commitments. UN officials
privately concede there is little chance of the US putting its forces under UN
command. Congress would never stand for it. The UK currently has fewer than 300
soldiers deployed on peacekeeping missions, mostly in Cyprus. “We’ve been
having goodness knows how many discussions with British officials with a view
to getting them more involved,” said Christofides. “We’re still drawing too
many troops from a few parts of the world and not enough from other parts of
the world. And I don’t just mean Africa versus the west, but other countries in
Asia and Latin America that could contribute a bit more.” Another senior UN
official put it more bluntly: “Britain has a reputation for lecturing without
contributing.” General David Richards, Britain’s chief of the defence staff, wants
to see Britain make a greater contribution. “The Ministry of Defence and, I
have to say sadly, the armed forces, don’t really see the UN as proper
soldiering. This is a cultural ignorance that’s grown up over many years. The
Americans share it writ large: UN ops is what second- and third-world nations
do but proper armies, we pick and choose,” he said.
India, which has sent
more soldiers on UN missions than any other country – 180,000 on 49 missions –
is openly challenging the move towards what some see as mostly rich and
powerful countries on the security council sending the poor to fight and die. India’s
ambassador to the UN, Asoke Kumar Mukerji said “The soldiers in the blue
helmets, under the blue flag, are impartial. They are not supposed to be
partisan. If somebody wants soldiers to go in and fight they should hire
mercenaries, not take UN soldiers.”
In Sierra Leone the Indian UN force commander, Major General
Vijay Jetley, interpreted his mandate as that of a neutral intermediary. India
said its troops were sent to monitor the peace, not enforce it. The UN mission
in Sierra Leone was further complicated by antipathy between some of the
national forces, particularly Jetley and his Nigerian deputy, Brigadier General
Mohammed Garba. In an internal UN report, Jetley accused Garba and other senior
Nigerians of being more interested in smuggling diamonds than keeping the
peace. Nigeria’s military responded by accusing the Indian general of “trying
to justify his ineptitude, inaction and inefficiency in the leadership of a
multinational force”.
12 years later in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as
rebels advanced on the eastern town of Goma. The Indian commander of part of
the largest peacekeeping force in the world ignored orders from UN officials to
defend the town and called the Indian defence ministry in New Delhi to ask what
he should do. He was told not to resist. The rebels seized Goma to the anger of
Ban Ki-Moon, who regarded it as a “personal humiliation”, according to a senior
UN official. The wider UN mission in the DRC had come to look like bystanders
to mass killing, rape and terror. Richard Gowan, until recently research
director at the Centre on International Cooperation, a thinktank in New York
that works closely with the UN on peacekeeping, said Indian forces in Sierra
Leone and the DRC were taking orders from the defence ministry in New Delhi,
not the UN commanders on the ground. The UN lost confidence in Jetley in Sierra
Leone but when the then secretary general, Kofi Annan, tried to remove him, the
Indian government threatened to pull out all of its forces. Annan’s successor,
Ban, ran into the same threats from New Delhi when he tried to remove the
Indian UN commander after the Goma debacle.
The debacle in Goma prompted the UN to put together a
fighting force of soldiers prepared to go into combat. South Africa, Tanzania
and Malawi volunteered to send troops to join the Force Intervention Brigade in
part because they were weary of the persistent instability in the region. Christofides
doubts that the force intervention brigade provides a model for other
peacekeeping missions. Senior UN officials, some of whom were strongly opposed
to the creation of the brigade but now judge it a success, are deeply wary of
the UN taking on a similar role in other conflicts. The DRC, they say, was a
unique situation.
“We were all embarrassed, humiliated at the end of 2012 when
Goma fell,” said Christofides, who oversaw UN peacekeeping operations in the
DRC from 2011 until earlier this year and was an architect of the intervention
brigade. “Everybody has that image of peacekeepers sitting on top of an APC
[armoured personnel carrier] and this group of ruffians walking into Goma. That
was a low moment for everybody.”
Early successes in Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique and El
Salvador generated an overconfidence in the ability of UN soldiers to keep the
peace. Each of those countries had an accord that former warring parties wanted
to maintain. The UN learned the hard way in Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia that
where the UN wants peace more than those in conflict, then the illusion of
peacekeeping can perpetuate instability and cost lives.
The UN intervention in Darfur was a politically panicked
response to public pressure over the mass killings by the government-allied
Janjaweed militia. “For political reasons the US and the UK insisted on having
the mission. I’ve spoken to UK officials since who’ve said: ‘We had no real
idea what this mission was meant to do. We were just under such public pressure
to come up with an answer and the answer was peacekeeping.’ That was definitely
true for the Bush administration as well,” Gowan explained. “Darfur has been a
quagmire from the beginning. The frank reality is no one believes that the
mission is working but no one dares pull it out because they fear the moment it
goes there will be an even greater spike in violence and the security council
will be held responsible. It’s become a slow burning disaster.”
Philippe Bolopion , the UN director at Human Rights Watch,
said the principal reason for the failure of the Darfur mission, a hybrid
operation with African Union forces, was deadlock on the security council. “When
permanent members of the Security Council can’t agree to stand up to an abusive
government such as Sudan’s, and you have weak peacekeeping troops on the
ground, it’s almost a perfect storm where peacekeepers are not going to protect
civilians properly,” he said. “Permanent members of the security council
routinely prioritise their national interest over the needs of the UN
peacekeeping missions they have mandated, as a result often undermining them.
Russia and China have done this by opposing more sanctions against the Sudanese
government even when it pushes peacekeepers around in Darfur.”
The responsibility to protect has had a more positive impact
elsewhere. Peacekeepers in South Sudan turned their bases into de facto refugee
camps protecting tens of thousands of people. That would have been unlikely 20
years ago. But the ethos has been severely challenged by the fallout from the
Security Council mandate for military intervention in the 2011 Libyan
revolution to protect civilians in Benghazi. NATO was accused of abusing it to
support the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. That complicated any potential UN
action on Syria.
India strongly opposes a move towards more forceful
peacekeeping. “When it has been used as a tool to ensure that a peace agreement
is observed so that peace building can take place, or as a tool to facilitate a
political resolution, it works,” said Mukerji, the Indian ambassador to the UN.
“But if peacekeeping is to be seen as peace enforcement, then unfortunately we
can’t see the UN charter allowing such a radical departure of the use of
peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is not an end in itself. The end is political
stability and peacekeeping is just a tool to bring about political stability.
What’s happening now is the cart is being put before the horse. I think that’s
a very unfortunate development.”
Gowan is sceptical for different reasons. “I think that we
may be stumbling into an enormous strategic trap because if we have learned
over the last decade that very highly capable Nato forces, US forces, actually
can’t suppress Islamic extremist groups, why on earth do we think slightly
strengthening UN missions is going to give us a tool that allows us to fight
terrorists?” he said.