The U.S. is trying to win a war for the hearts and minds of Africa.
But a Pentagon investigation suggests that those mystery projects
somewhere out there in Djibouti or Ethiopia or Kenya or here in Tanzania
may well be orphaned, ill-planned, and undocumented
failures-in-the-making. According to the Department of Defense’s
watchdog agency, U.S. military officials in Africa “did not adequately
plan or execute” missions designed to win over Africans deemed
vulnerable to the lures of violent extremism.
This evidence of failure in the earliest stages of the U.S.
military’s hearts-and-minds campaign should have an eerie resonance for
anyone who has followed its previous efforts to use humanitarian aid and
infrastructure projects to sway local populations in Vietnam, Iraq, or
Afghanistan. In each case, the operations failed in spectacular ways,
but were only fully acknowledged after years of futility and billions of
dollars in waste.
Today, the U.S. military increasingly confronts Africa as a "battlefield" or "battleground" or "war" in the words of the men running its operations. To that end, it has built a sophisticated
logistics network to service a growing number of small outposts, camps, and airfields, while carrying out,
on average, more than one mission each day somewhere on the continent.
A significant number of these operations take the form of a textbook
hearts-and-minds campaign that harkens back to failed U.S. efforts in
Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s and more recently in the
Greater Middle East.
In Africa, the sums and scale are smaller, but the efforts are from
the same counterinsurgency playbook. In fact, to the U.S. military,
humanitarian assistance -- from medical care to infrastructure projects
-- is a form of “security cooperation.” According to the latest edition
of FM 3-24, published earlier this year:
“When these
activities are used to defeat an insurgency, they are part of a
counterinsurgency operation. While not all security cooperation
activities are in support of counterinsurgency, security cooperation can
be an effective counterinsurgency tool. These activities help the U.S.
and the host nation gain credibility and help the host nation build
legitimacy. These efforts can help prevent insurgencies...”
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and its subordinate command, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
based at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, have spent years engaged in such
COIN-style humanitarian projects. These have been touted in news
releases at their websites in lieu of candid information on the true scale and scope of AFRICOM’s operations, the exponential growth of its activities, its spy operations, and shadowy base-building
efforts. Take a cursory glance at its official news releases and
you’ll find them crammed with feel-good stories like an effort by
CJTF-HOA personnel to tutor
would-be Djiboutian hotel workers in English or a joint effort by the
State Department, AFRICOM, and the Army Corps of Engineers to build
six new schools in Togo. Such acts are never framed in the context of
counterinsurgency nor with an explicit link to U.S. efforts to win
hearts and minds. And never is there any mention of failings or
fiascos.
However, an investigation by the Department of Defense’s Inspector General (IG), completed last October but never publicly released,
found failures in planning, executing, tracking, and documenting such
projects. The restricted report, obtained by TomDispatch, describes a
flawed system plagued by a variety of deeply embedded problems.
Across Africa, the U.S. military is engaged in a panoply of aid
projects with an eye toward winning a war of ideas in the minds of
Africans and so beating back the lure of extremist ideologies -- from
that of Boko Haram in Nigeria to Somalia’s al Shabab. These so-called civil-military operations, or CMOs, include “humanitarian assistance”
projects like the construction or repair of schools, water wells and
waste treatment systems, and “humanitarian and civic assistance” (HCA)
efforts, like offering dental and veterinary care.
Kindness may be its own reward, but in the case of the U.S. military,
CMO benevolence is designed to influence foreign governments and
civilian populations in order to “facilitate military operations and
achieve U.S. objectives.”
According to the Pentagon, humanitarian
assistance efforts are engineered to improve “U.S. visibility, access,
and influence with foreign military and civilian counterparts,” while
HCA projects are designed to “promote the security and foreign policy
interests of the United States.”
In the bureaucratic world of the U.S.
military, these small-scale efforts are further divided into “community
relations activities,” like the distribution of sports equipment, and
“low-cost activities” such as seminars on solar panel maintenance or
English-language discussion groups. Theoretically at least, add all
these projects together and you’ve taken a major step toward winning
Africans away from the influence of extremists. But are these projects
working at all? Has anyone even bothered to check?
The IG did manage to review 49 of 137 identified
humanitarian assistance and civic assistance projects, which cost U.S.
taxpayers about $9 million, and found that the military officials
overseeing CMO “did not adequately plan or execute” them in accordance
with AFRICOM’s “objectives.” Examining 66 community relations and low cost
activities, investigators found that CJTF-HOA had failed to accurately
identify their strategic objectives for, or maintained limited
documentation on, 62% of them.
Examining a sample of projects, the Pentagon’s investigators found
that 73% of the time CJTF-HOA personnel failed to collect sufficient
data 30 days after completion of projects, to assess whether it achieved
the stated objectives.
Winning Hearts and Minds or Losing Money and Influence?
Nearly a year has passed since the drafting of the Inspector
General’s report. During that time, neither AFRICOM nor CJTF-HOA has
publicly addressed it or announced any changes based upon its
recommendations. In the meantime, the hearts and minds of allied
African military leaders appear unswayed by AFRICOM’s efforts. Over two
days at the “Land Forces East Africa” conference here in Dar es Salaam,
I listened to generals and defense analysts from around the region
speak on security matters affecting Burundi, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, and
Tanzania. They touched on the key issues -- extremism, terrorism, and
piracy -- that the American hearts-and-minds campaign is meant to
counter, but the United States was hardly mentioned. Tanzanian officers
I talked with, for instance, were pleased to be receiving American
funds, but less so with direct U.S. interventions of any type on the
continent. None I spoke with seemed aware of AFRICOM’S hearts-and-minds
work like clean water projects or school construction in underdeveloped
rural areas not so very far from where we’ve been sitting.
Even Egan O’Reilly, an Army officer attached to the U.S. Embassy
here, whose job is to facilitate “security cooperation” activities, “
We’ve done
everything from helping bring down trainers for military intelligence
courses to building their own schoolhouse for intelligence work,” he
tells me.
What about the building of primary and secondary schools, the
humanitarian assistance projects? “
I haven’t seen a whole lot of
AFRICOM work myself,” replies the West Point graduate and veteran of the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"Logistics training and engineering instruction for African
militaries, that’s “the important stuff.”
TomDispatch also sought interviews with U.S. defense attachés in
Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya for assessments of the humanitarian
projects in those respective countries. The latter two embassies failed
to respond to the requests, while a spokesperson for the U.S. mission
in Ethiopia thanked me for my interest but told me that the defense
attaché “is not currently available for an interview.” No one, it
appears, is eager to talk about the textbook counterinsurgency campaign
being carried out by the U.S. military in Africa, let alone the failures
chronicled in an IG report that’s been withheld from the public for
almost a year.
For the last decade, we’ve been inundated with disclosures about
billions of U.S. tax dollars squandered on counterinsurgency failures in
Iraq and Afghanistan, stories of ruined roads and busted buildings, shoddy schoolhouses and wasteful water parks,
all in the name of winning hearts and minds. Below the radar, similar
-- if smaller scale -- efforts are well underway in Africa. Already,
the schools are being built, already the water projects are falling to
pieces, already the Department of Defense’s Inspector General has
identified a plethora of problems. It’s just been kept under wraps.
But if history is any guide, humanitarian efforts by AFRICOM and
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa will grow larger and ever more
expensive, until they join the long list of projects that have become
“monuments to U.S. failure” around the world.
Nick Turse from here with more and links