There’s power in the union

Copper mining remains the dominant economic activity in Zambia, a situation that has not changed since 1928 when large-scale mining was introduced in the country. According to a World Bank report released in June 2015, the sector today accounts for more than sixty-five percent of Zambia’s export earnings and eleven percent of its gross domestic product. The mining sector has also seen the largest number of industrial accidents and fatalities in post-colonial Zambia.

The widespread privatisation of the Zambian copper mining sector in the 1990s led to the (re)emergence of foreign mining companies in the country, including several state-owned companies from China. China’s increasing presence in Zambia has also given rise to a number of concerns. Some Chinese mining companies have been accused of maintaining lax safety standards, paying low wages to local employees—especially if compared to other foreign mining companies—and of physically abusing their workers. For these reasons, critics have accused the Zambian government of weakening its safety standards to attract foreign investors, of failing to monitor compliance with safety and labour laws, and of underfunding local regulators.

These critics allege that this has triggered a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour standards. By ‘race to the bottom’, they refer to a tendency where the government reduces the monitoring and enforcement capacity of public regulatory institutions, or enacts lax safety laws, in order to attract foreign investors. They not only argue that the Zambian government weakens safety standards through funding cuts, but they also claim that current regulatory standards are obsolete and that the government intervenes in the decision-making process of regulators to protect Chinese companies from paying penalties when they fail to comply with local regulations.

In April 2005, fifty-two Zambians were killed in an accident in an explosives factory jointly owned by the Beijing General Institute for Research and Metallurgy (BGRIMM) and the Non-Ferrous China-Africa (NFCA) Mining Company—both state-owned companies—in Chambishi in Zambia’s Copperbelt Province. One year after the accident at the BGRIMM plant, five Zambians were shot and injured by gunshots fired by their Chinese manager while they were protesting against low wages and lax safety standards at the NFCA Chambishi mine. In August 2008, more than five hundred Zambian workers attacked a newly built Chinese-owned Chambishi Copper Smelter and burnt down the kitchen of a Chinese-resident. One Chinese and three Zambians working in the kitchen were seriously injured. The protesters claimed that they had been told that the management was going on vacation and abandoning collective negotiations in which workers had demanded changes in safety standards and a reduction in work hours. In another accident that attracted a lot of media attention in 2010, a Chinese supervisor at the Collum Coal mine in Southern Province shot thirteen Zambians. The workers at the mine were complaining against the state of safety standards in the mines and their low wages. These accidents and protests have raised serious debate about labour and safety standards in Chinese mines in Zambia.

The formulation of safety and labour regulations in Zambia is based on a state/business-centred approach that ignores the role of non-state actors, such as trade unions, mine workers, local NGOs, and international organisations.

A 2011 study by Human Rights Watch (HRW) has highlighted, Chinese mining companies in Zambia still have further reforms to make in order to strengthen their efforts to mitigate accidents. These include improving the safety conditions of workers hired by subcontractors, reducing the number of casual employees, and cutting the number of working hours.

Trade unions have organised protests, and pushed the issue into the public agenda. In response to these protests, some Chinese mining companies have altered their safety policies and normalised their relations with unions. Furthermore, under mounting public pressure, the Zambian government has introduced labour laws and established structures to strengthen its safety regulatory standards in the last decade.

http://www.chinoiresie.info/regulating-chinese-investment-in-zambian-mines/

Chinese Neo-Colonialism

China’s increasing role has created unease in America and Europe. The US and EU obviously fears losing business: African trade with China surpassed that with America in 2009. China has participated in 16 U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa and is planning to create its first military base in Djibouti. African countries also have discovered that Beijing desires what the U.S. demanded in the past: political loyalty, resource control, investment return. Beijing also often demands concessions for land, minerals or other commodities in return. Moreover, it often requires use of Chinese firms, even bringing laborers from China. This limits the economic benefit to Africa and is seen as a new version of neocolonialism. The “Ugly Chinese” looks much like the “Ugly American” of days gone by. Explained a recent Rand Corp. report: “Labor unions, civil society groups and other segments of African society criticize Chinese enterprises for their poor labor conditions, unsustainable environmental practices and job displacement.” The Rand report says “African perceptions of China include a mix of approval, apathy and contempt.”

President Xi Jinping recently promised African officials $60 billion in new investment. Most of the $60 billion will be concessional loans. Even cheap loans may become a significant burden to repay. Observed The Times: “Infrastructure projects in Nigeria have been fueled by the same manic lending that has also created mountains of debt for China’s economy at home.” Inevitable defaults will cost both Africa and China.

Moreover, Africa long has been awash in “aid” from multilateral development banks, but much of that has been stolen or wasted. Beijing’s experience so far is no different. For instance, more than $1 billion essentially vanished, noted the Economist magazine, after being invested in a palm oil plantation in a region where “there were no roads, the river was barely navigable and villagers were hostile.” Because of the lack of conditionality, observed Brad Parks of the research lab AidData, “African officials know that they have more leeway with Beijing’s money, and they use it.”

Chinese Neo-Colonialism

The last summit of the triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) saw president Hu Jintao put on the table $20 billion in loans to African countries, doubling its previous offer.  As bilateral trade volumes have grown, Beijing will be expected to offer billions more at this year’s forum in South Africa.

However, Africa can also expect to witness notably more incidences of state-sponsored domestic violence, both against civilians and competitors such as rebel groups, as Chinese aid increases, a new study shows. Research finds that the appetite for Beijing's money by the continent is because it can be used as leaders see fit--including to keep rivals at bay. Authors Roudabeh Kishi and Clionadh Raleigh, of the University of Sussex’s Department of Geography, say this effect is largely because aid from China is fungible, with its use determined by recipient countries. Their working paper, titled Chinese Aid and Africa’s Pariah States, finds that political violence by the state increases with receipt of Chinese aid. The same is not observed with aid from ‘traditional’ or Western donors, which comes tagged with conditions. Because Chinese aid is disbursed under a “non-interference policy” that does not seek to influence the domestic policies of recipient states, leaders have a lot of leeway over where it is used.

“Due to the lack of obvious conditionality, African leaders can use Chinese aid in the ways they see fit and suited to their political, economic and social needs. In practice, Chinese aid directly supports the regimes of states,” the authors write.

Critics of Beijing’s aid say that its packages provide funding for pariah states, while undoing the longer-term benefits from the conditions tied to the aid given by the West. “Though China isn’t specifically giving aid to ‘pariah states’, it is making states into pariahs through providing resources to state leaders who are unafraid to use repression as a means to quell competition,” the researchers noted. China has also been accused of only seeking Africa’s natural resources and cultivating ties with states accused of poor human rights so as to rope in supporters for Beijing’s own iron-fist internal model. The study finds that this is not the position. Essentially, China is an “equal-opportunity” lender. The only countries that have not benefited from China’s aid have been pro-Taipei Burkina Faso and Swaziland, and The Gambia until it recently cut ties with Taiwan. Chinese aid is however not as no-strings-attached as advertised, the paper highlighted. Its model poses the danger of countries remaining dependent on resources, while increased competition has also made African goods uncompetitive among other criticisms such as on labour and environmental standards

While Africa’s resources are important for feeding its growth, the world’s second biggest economy also seeks new markets for its goods, and to build international coalitions with non-Western states including those in Africa, for pursuits such as support for its “One China” policy. As such, its aid is directed towards whichever countries satisfy those needs, with a recipient’s institutional quality or type having no bearing on its choices. China’s aid is cited for the “significantly” higher rates of violence by states, both against competitors and against civilians.

This is evident when compared with aid from traditional donors, and even when the researchers mitigated for different rates of resource exports and the strength of the rule of law, and any other aspect of the state which may help explain existing violence rates.

“If the state has complete control over its budget, it will use its position to bolster its capacity to repress any potential opposition in order to secure its position,” the study noted.

Western aid is not absolved of blame—it also fuels conflicts by making the “prize” of rebellion more attractive to insurgents, who would very much like the power to redistribute it and support patronage networks. The jury remains out over the efficacy of “tied” aid—while its supporters claimed it had in the post-Cold War period made African countries better governed, scholars note there was little evidence of this. The study notes that China has successfully exploited the angst around Western donor preconditions by leveraging on its policy of non-interference, shared colonial history and by dangling its recent turbo-charged growth at African leaders.

To make their case, the researchers tested whether levels of armed violence rose with increases in Chinese aid, and whether it was specifically perpetrated by the state. They also compared the incidence of violence under Western aid flows, and controlled for variables such as resource dependence, GDP strength, democracy or lack of, the rule of law, populations and existing conflict. Some of their findings included that China does not specifically target countries with more natural resources, and that autocratic regimes do not generally receive a higher proportion of aid.

Because Chinese aid is meant to benefit China, they also found that countries with a weaker rule of law get more aid as they have an environment that allows Chinese business to flourish. Additionally, increased Chinese aid relative to a state’s GDP led to more incidences of state-supported conflict, while rebel groups or other conflict actors were not seen to be taking up arms any more due to the availability of Chinese aid.

“In short, Chinese aid increases the ability go the state to repress domestic competition, opposition and civilians. Compared to traditional aid, the effect is limited to state forces and goals,” said the study.

This is true even if internal country dynamics are different, it noted, citing countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

“Often the strategies and tactics for ensuring regime stability and regime longevity might be outside the preferred conduct of Western aid donors, hence unconditional/Chinese aid is attractive. Other scholars have noted the use of Chinese aid for ‘prestige’ projects or funnelling money to allies and supporters for the same reasons,” the authors told M&G Africa.

But despite this, or perhaps because of it, Chinese aid has been particularly useful to African leaders seeking to remain in power.

Africa - Made in China

Chinese intervention in Africa is nowhere near the scale practiced by the United States or France. But when civil war broke out in Libya four years ago, Beijing had to evacuate 36,000 Chinese nationals living in the country. China certainly didn’t want to ask Western powers to help rescue its citizens.

“China had to do the entire evacuation on its own without any assistance whatsoever,” recalls David Shinn, a former American ambassador to Ethiopia and Burkina Faso “That was a wake-up call for the Chinese.”

Since China’s initial contribution to anti-piracy activities, the country greatly increased maritime cooperation in with Africa, holding exercises with Tanzania and providing warships to the Nigerian navy. In 2013, South Sudan collapsed into civil war. China soon embarked on its first major military intervention in Africa—deploying 700 soldiers as part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. While China had far more peacekeepers deployed to Africa than any other four permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the South Sudan mission is the first that explicitly includes Chinese combat troops.

The main thing is that China wants to be an economic and diplomatic superpower in Africa. Beijing’s most important businesses with African countries is the arms trade. China has exported massive amounts of heavy and light weapons to the continent in recent years. The Chinese government is signing security-related partnerships with Egypt

“If you go back to the ’60s and ’70s, Chinese weapons were somewhere about three percent of all arms going into Africa,” Shinn recalls. “If you look at it up until 2010 or ’11, around 25 percent of all arms going Africa, by dollar value are Chinese.”

Chinese companies don’t really care who they sell their merchandise to. “A lot of those arms go to effectively pariah countries like Zimbabwe and Sudan,” Shinn says. Both countries are under European Union and U.S. arms embargoes, and look to China as a no-questions-asked weapons supplier. In early 2014 media outlets began to report on a massive delivery of small arms and ammunition to South Sudan government troops from Chinese state-owned arms manufacturer Norinco. China is also arming South Sudanese troops with anti-aircraft missiles. China heavily invests in South Sudan’s oil infrastructure, and wants to protect it.

Kind-hearted China ?

China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, on a five-nation tour of Africa, insisted “I want to make clear one point, that is, China will never follow the track of western colonists and all cooperation with Africa will never come at the expense of the ecology, environment or long-term interests of Africa.” His remarks were made to Chinese Central Television while Wang was in Kenya, where Chinese firms are carrying out a $653m (£430m) expansion of the main airport in the capital, Nairobi.

A diplomatic cable, published via WikiLeaks in 2010 and not intended for public consumption, had an US official suggesting a less than altruistic purpose: “China is a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals. China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons. China is in Africa for China primarily.”

 Richard Poplak, Daily Maverick correspondent and co-author of a forthcoming book examining China’s relationship with the continent, concurs.

“Those are wonderful sentiments, but they don't really stand up to scrutiny. On the many projects I've visited on the continent being built by Chinese state-owned enterprises – which is to say companies executing Chinese foreign policy whims – the environmental assessments have been poor or non-existent. For the foreign ministry's statements to have any resonance, Chinese state-owned enterprises need to transparently adhere to global best practices, or spare us the rhetoric. I'm not saying the Chinese are 'worse' than those from whom the foreign minister is distancing his country. I'm saying they're no better, until they prove otherwise.”

Ross Anthony, interim director of Stellenbosch University’s Centre for Chinese Studies, who told the Daily Maverick that the lofty language doesn’t necessarily match China’s hard-nosed business approach. “Chinese defence against ‘neo-colonialism’ is nothing new; several Chinese presidents, ministers and ambassadors have been refuting this claim as long as (particularly) western critics have been making it,” said Anthony.

Even if we assume that there is no hint of neo-colonialism in China’s involvement in Africa, it does not necessarily follow that China’s motives are pure, nor that Africa will benefit from its presence here.

“What I have witnessed, from talks with academics and business people, is that the relation seems to be placed on a more equal level, on the basis of mutual interest,” commented Gaia Manco, a freelance journalist who splits her time between Johannesburg and Beijing, and who is a specialist on the China-Africa relationship. “The key interest is making business, and more precisely trade. So China might not be here to exploit [just] African resources, but they are certainly here to sell Chinese products and technology, and I will not expect Chinese business to care about any African long-term interest, such as the establishment of African factories and businesses. So yes, Chinese rulers and businesspeople might be right when they don't see themselves as colonialists, but does this mean a benefit for Africa in the end?”

Feeding the Dragon

China is ramping up investment in Sub Saharan Africa as it searches for natural resources. Its foreign direct investment (FDI) in particular has played a prominent role in economic interactions with many developing countries. It's now one of the largest 'emerging' investors, especially in Sub Saharan Africa countries, it has investments being in Nigeria, Sudan, South Africa and Angola among others, but whether the benefits are mutually beneficial is questionable. What remains unclear is whether China's foray Africa has any real intention in helping to promote economic growth and development in these countries. Recently, the Bilateral Sino-African partnership has not yielded much competitiveness to Africa. There was no significant skill set development, nor adequate technological transfer or any measurable upgrade to the productivity levels in Africa.

China is in pursuit of oil, gas, precious metals and mining to diversify its energy resource import's pool; it requires other resources to sustain its manufacturing capabilities. Africa can offer all of these things to the world's second largest economy: about 40 percent of global reserves of natural resources, 60 percent of uncultivated agricultural land, a billion people with rising purchasing power and a potential army of low-wage workers. China has undertaken multiple investments in Sub Saharan Africa that most people believe are due its search for natural resources to feed its industrial output.

African countries are one of the fastest growing markets and profitable outlets for exported manufactured goods. In the past, the U.K. and France were the prime trade partners for Africa, however, today, China is Africa top bi-lateral trading partner with trade volume exceeding $166 billion. Between years 2003 and 2011, its FDI in the continent has increased thirty fold from $491 million to $14.7 billion. Not a long time ago, China eyed areas in Africa where resources were abundant and easy to extract. It focused on resource-rich countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Zambia. Today, Sino-African investment focus has become broader. China is branching out into non-resource-rich investments, focusing on countries such as Ethiopia and Congo. Higher margins have attracted many state-owned enterprises and private companies to compete on gaining dominion in the vast continent. Oil, gas, metals and minerals constitute three-quarters of African-exports to China. Chinese Imports to Africa are more diverse, mostly comprised of manufactured goods. China has made considerable investments in the fields of infrastructure targeting key sectors including ports refurbishments, telecommunications, transport, construction and water disposal categorically. Geographically speaking, China has become an important partner of East Africa with some of its biggest projects in Uganda with an estimated total investment of $596 million in 2012 alone. China's increased presence in East Africa has gradually raised concerns about the economic development of these countries as well as the environmental and social sustainability of their natural resources.

The Chinese entry to the African market has collapsed the already frail and small and medium enterprises under increasing pressure from cheap Chinese Imports. According to one recent study, the Chinese growing presence in Africa has accrued a cost to the South Africa's economy in the range of 75,000 jobs in the years 2000-2011. China's relationship with Africa has often been described as "colonial", in which most of the benefits are far from mutual and often accrued to China. China has seemingly created a dependency for the African countries, without providing real structural help to show integration in the local communities. Exploitation of labor, protectionism of technologies and distance from the interests of a real wish for inclusion, the current activities of China in Africa, raise pressing doubts about supposed mutual benefits.

Taken from here 

The Chinese influence

A recent study shows China’s development aid for Africa flows primarily to the home-lands of leading African politicians, when there was greater need for aid in another part of the same country. On average, 270% more financial contributions go to these locations rather than to other areas, the study reveals.

“Leading politicians in recipient countries spend a portion of Chinese aid on personal interests, which can restrict the effectiveness of the aid,” said Axel Dreher, from the Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics at the University of Heidelberg and was among the authors of the study Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance. The team, consisting of researchers from the United States, Switzerland, Australia and Germany, investigated around 2,000 Chinese development aid projects from 2010 to 2012. The study covered more than 3,500 locations and a total aid value of $90 billion.

China has repeatedly indicated that its foreign investments are not attached to any political agenda. But it is precisely this supposed neutrality that gives African elites the ability to use the funds to their own advantage, the researchers point out. “China’s position makes it possible for African politicians to transfer a substantial portion of Chinese funding to their constituencies,” Dreher indicated. The fact that leading African politicians use development funds to finance their own political agendas immensely undermines the effectiveness of Chinese development aid.

Economically the bilateral trade volume last year exceeded $ 200 billion. In the past, China invested mainly in Africa’s extractive industry. Now things are changing. Currently, Beijing’s investment in African energy accounts for just 20% of the total. China is investing more in infrastructure, manufacturing, and agricultural industries. Beijing’s primary interest is no longer African energy, rather in manufacturing industries. China’s position in the global production networks, by transferring its cost-effective industry to Africa. The previously destination for outsourcing are now the out-sourcers themselves.

China and its African neo-colonialism

David Owiro, project officer at local think tank, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), tells IPS that  “China’s interest in Africa is primarily based on Africa’s mineral wealth.” Angola is rich in diamonds and their longstanding relation with China is built on that natural wealth, adding that “Angola’s capital Luanda is home to nearly three million Chinese.”

 During the May 4 to 11 trip, Li attended the World Economic Forum on Africa in Abuja, Nigeria, and visited Ethiopia, Angola and Kenya.

During his visit to Kenya, Li and the government signed 15 deals — particularly relating to construction and agriculture. This included the controversial Standard Gauge Railway deal where China will fund and build a 3.8-billion-dollar railway from Kenya’s port of Mombasa to Nairobi in the project’s first phase. The railway will eventually connect Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan. Under the terms of the agreement, Exim Bank of China will provide 90 percent of the cost and Kenya the remaining 10 percent.

“The project is too expensive and makes no economic sense. The period it will take Kenya to repay China for this loan has also not been made clear,” Owiro says.  Owiro also said, China is currently not transferring any technological knowledge “all the Chinese-driven construction in Africa is done by the Chinese themselves. It is only after an outcry during the building of Nairobi-Thika Superhighway that the Chinese brought in a few Kenyans to do a few manual jobs”.

Ken Ogwang, a Nairobi-based property developer and economic expert, says that there are about 2,500 Chinese firms in Africa, but the continent is still getting a raw deal.
“Studies have shown that Chinese firms in Africa create very minimal sub-economies. Where Chinese companies have been building roads, you expect locals to begin earning from feeding the constructors, housing them and so on,” he tells IPS. But, as Owiro explains, this does not happen. “The Chinese build their own campuses, and bring in what they need.

Africom Versus China

The United States, like its allies Britain and France, has long maintained influence and indirect control in Africa through financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and African Development Bank. It has exerted political influence using aid organizations such as USAID and NGOs like the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House and others.

With programs such as the Pan-Sahel Initiative, later broadened into the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative, Washington managed to provide military and financial assistance to compliant countries in North Africa – a policy whose practical application meant that the US military became the dominant force in the Sahel region, supplying the human and material resources for which the governments of the region were starved. Naturally, this meant an implicit subservience to US military command.  In 2013 alone, AFRICOM conducted joint exercises with fourteen African nations, leading land, sea, and air-based operations.

In 2007 the Bush administration created US Africa Command (AFRICOM) to act as the umbrella organization under which all US military activity in Africa would fall. AFRICOM became an officially independent command a year later, and in the seven years its scope of activity has broadened tremendously, with its direct or indirect presence extending into nearly every country on the continent. “AFRICOM advances US national interests and promotes regional security, stability, and prosperity.” Ostensibly, the US military acts to defend ‘democracies’ in Africa for the collective betterment of the people of the continent. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Theresa Whelan stated in 2007, “AFRICOM is about helping Africans build greater capacity to assure their own security.”

 However, a more critical analysis would question exactly how Washington defines “security, stability, and prosperity,” and perhaps most importantly, whose prosperity they’re principally interested in. Vice-Admiral Robert Moeller, military deputy to former commander of AFRICOM General William ‘Kip’ Ward, provides the answer when he  told an AFRICOM conference in 2008 that AFRICOM’s goal was “protecting the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market.” Furthermore, Moeller wrote in 2010, “Let there be no mistake. AFRICOM’s job is to protect American lives and promote American interests.”

 AFRICOM is to provide a military presence to ensure the continued exploitation of Africa for the enrichment of finance capital, and the maintenance and expansion of US hegemony on the continent. China is rapidly challenging US economic hegemony in Africa. Having invested in a variety of sectors from mining and oil, to telecommunications and banking, China has made itself into a viable alternative to US, World Bank, and IMF investment and aid. Naturally, this has upset the political and corporate establishment in the US who see in China a threat to their power.  Professor and China scholar Deborah Brautigam noted in 2013,“Chinese imports and exports, outbound investment aid, and export finance are all sharply on the rise. For example, trade between China and Africa rose from $10 billion in 2000 to $166.3 billion in 2011… [In 2012] Chinese leaders announced a goal of $20 billion in finance to African countries by 2015. If carried out, an average of between $6 and $7 billion would flow to Africa per year.” Brautigam’s numbers illustrate the fact that it is only slightly below yearly US total investment in the continent ($9 billion) and so US policy in Africa  should be understood within the context of checking China’s growing power and influence.

 One  example is the US-sponsored break up of Sudan and the creation of South Sudan. n order to power its massive industrial sector and population, China has become the world’s leading energy importer, with lucrative contracts all over the world. However, Beijing’s primary oil source in Africa was Sudan, which accounted for 8 percent of China’s total oil imports (China being the recipient of a whopping 78% of total Sudanese exports). With the oilfields being located primarily in the south of the country, the US led the charge to dismantle Sudan and create a South Sudan that would be dependent on US finance and military muscle (provided by AFRICOM and US clients such as Uganda and Rwanda) for its very survival. The continuing violence and bloodshed in South Sudan – a result of internal power struggles between competing US aligned factions – is merely collateral damage in Washington’s growing proxy war with China.

All over Africa, the United States has tried to check the growing influence of China [ who choose to prefer the tactic of money in the banks of those it courts rather than boots on the ground - Socialist  Banner]. From Nigeria to South Africa, Angola to Sudan, the US is engaging in a widespread proxy war with the expressed intention of maintaining its dominant position in Africa. Using its vast military resources, Washington seeks to cement its African hegemony using the same colonial tactics as every other empire that came before it.

From here 

China And Japan In Africa - In Whose Interest?

Africa was seen by Leopold II as a ‘magnificent African cake’ and still is considered as such by new foreign interests. Between the Chinese and the Japanese it seems the Japanese, like the West, seeks to ‘contain’ China’s influence in Africa. The Chinese aspire to a win-win-South-South cooperation and the restoration of Asia and Africa’s dignity.

The logic of foreign powers’ competing interests in Africa denotes a colonial mentality still prevailing toward Africa! What Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent visit to Africa uncovered is a clear plan that Japan and Western powers have: To “contain” China’s influence in Africa. Africa is talked about just as a “walk over”, a battleground for other people’s interests except African people’s interests! Africa has been in that position since the slavery, apartheid, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and now what I call “neo-multi-influencialism”, that is to say, after the Cold War, all major powers are seeking to maintain their influence in Africa to safeguard their strategic interests there (raw materials, geopolitical support at the UN Security Council) without taking the interests of Africans themselves into consideration (making other people rich while remaining poor yourself and being convinced by those you make rich that you are actually poor and you need help, help, help!).

It is the strategic interests of these major powers that drive their strategic policies toward Africa (they decide everything about Africa without African themselves). Congo’s natural and mineral resources have been systematically looted in the last 16 years by the same people who are coming to Congo as investors. What does the term “investor” mean in this case? If America and its NATO allies can go and bomb Iraq and Afghanistan back to the stone age and award contracts to American companies to “rebuild” these countries, is that what “globalization” is all about?

 African countries themselves may have their own policies toward these major powers, but they remain on paper. Africans do not have any means to implement their own policies. Nearly 90 percent of the African Union’s budget itself is financed from outside. So, Africans have only one policy: the bigger the donation, the happier they are!

Pandering to Western powers’ influence is exactly what Zimbabwean scholars Jonathan Moyo and Charity Manyeruke think has been happening. According to Jonathan Moyo, the one very clear and disappointing state of politics in Africa today is precisely the issue raised by President Mugabe in the interview on the occasion of his 88th birthday of not just cowardice of the so-called new breed of African leaders but also their treachery (Sydney Kawadza, “Some African leaders coward,” ‘The Herald,’ 20 February, 2012).

“It’s not only that they want budgetary support from Western powers or genuinely want to address anything in Africa. It’s simply that they are sellouts by definition. They don’t think about their people but themselves and their pockets.” (Herald Reporter, ‘Political analysts castigate puppet African leaders,’ ‘The Herald,’ 21 February, 2012).


Japan is an industrial state without natural resources wants to consolidate its interests in Africa to ensure a steady flow of African resources to feed its industries. China too needs natural resources to feed its growing economy. But there are differences between the two Asian countries, as far as their policies toward Africa are concerned.

 Japan boasts modern high-technology industries. But unlike China, Japan has never transferred its technology to Africa. Africa does not need big donations forever. Africa needs modern technologies so that it can transform its resources on the spot and create jobs and markets for its people at national, regional. continental and international levels. China has already transferred some of its technologies to Africa (the Hisense company in South Africa and oil extraction technology in Sudan). Indeed, “give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime” (Chinese proverb).

History has proven that we Africans can believe and trust China. We trust China when China says that it is ready to cooperate with any other major power in Africa provided that “we put African interests first”. As Chinese scholar Luo Jianbo writes, “of course, it is well known that a nation’s foreign policy always serves its national interests first. China is no exception. China never denies that its African policy aims to pursue its own strategic interests in Africa [nor that it has not made mistakes there]. However, one of the most outstanding features of China’s African policy from the very beginning is its aspiration to promote a win-win-South-South cooperation and the restoration of Asia and Africa’s dignity. China’s engagement in Africa provides Africa with new development opportunities and promotes Africa to integrate in the international system in a more favorable way, that is to say, as an equal partner (Luo Jianbo, “China-Africa relations and China’s international responsibility,” ‘World Economics and Politics,’ 2013, Vol.9, No.397, pp.52-70). Those who want to keep a kind of “master-slave” relationship with Africa are not happy about that.


Antoine Roger Lokongo from here

The Chinese Soft Power in Africa

China, which, through state-run company Poly Technologies Inc (PTI), donated a swimming pool and sports complex to the armed forces of Ghana in 2011. As well as the Olympic-size pool, complete with sun loungers, there's a gym, with weights and cardio equipment, and a studio where soldiers and civilians mingle over step aerobics, the Tae Bo fitness system, a weight loss programme and African dance. There are tennis courts, seven-a-side football pitches, volleyball, beach volleyball and a restaurant run by the Southern Fried Chicken franchise.


The country's ability to host the 2008 Africa Cup of Nations was given a huge boost by a $100m (£65m) soft loan from China for new stadiums, and construction is about to begin on a stadium in the colonial-era capital Cape Coast in central Ghana, for which China donated $30m.

"China has offered to build our new 15,000-capacity stadium at Cape Coast, without asking for anything in return," says Michael Frimpong, director of public relations for Ghana's ministry of sport.

Nothing in return?
PTI, for example, is one of China's top three arms manufacturers. It is a subsidiary of the state-controlled outfit China Poly Group Corporation, based in Beijing. Critics accuse PTI of exporting weapons to repressive regimes such as Burma and Zimbabwe, which paves the way for resource extraction by Chinese-owned firms.

And there is more to Ghana's relationship with PTI than treadmills and abdominal crunches. In 2011, a month before the new complex was completed, Ghana commissioned two 46-metre patrol vessels worth almost $40m from the company. Ghana has also entered into high-profile bilateral agreements with China such as a $10bn loan for infrastructure projects and a $3bn loan for its oil and gas sector. A source at the Chinese embassy said it had registered more than 300 Chinese companies that have opened an office in Ghana.
"China has a longstanding practice of offering package deals to countries in Africa," said David Shinn, professor of international affairs at George Washington University and co-author of China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. "They include very large concessionary loans that must be paid back, frequently with raw materials. These loans are often used to construct large infrastructure projects tied to Chinese companies and sometimes a component of Chinese labour. It is not unusual to include grants in kind [which] very often come in the form of a stadium, government building, or sports complex." Shinn adds: "In terms of the total package, the grants are usually a modest component and fall in the category of public relations. The idea is to garner good publicity for China."

The Chinese government has backed 1,700 projects on continent in 50 countries since 2000 in apparent attempt to win favour. $75bn (£48bn) on aid and development projects in Africa in the past decade (compared with $90bn the US committed over that period).

In Liberia, China has put millions towards the installation of solar traffic lights in Monrovia and financed a malaria prevention centre. In Mozambique, China's projects include a National School for Visual Arts in Maputo. In Algeria, construction has begun on a multimillion dollar 1,400-seat opera house in the Ouled Fayet suburbs of western Algiers. China has also sent thousands of doctors and teachers to work in Africa, welcomed many more students to learn in China or in Chinese language classes abroad and rolled out a continent-wide network of sports stadiums and concert halls.

The "China-Zambia Friendship Hospital" opened in August 2011 and includes casualty, dental and maternity wards as well as laboratories. It has 159 beds, treats 2,600 patients and delivers 260 babies each month on average. John Kachimba, medical superintendent and consultant urologist, said "I believe it was a gift from China. I think it was just a sign of friendship. They built this, they built a stadium in the copper belt." It was also certainly good PR, he says. "Looking at the hospital, your impression of them will be much better than looking at a mine with poor safety standards and controversy over wages. For them, the hospital is definitely a positive thing."

Many of the cultural and sporting projects across the continent are probably "upfront sweeteners" to win government favour, a "downpayment" for future commercial deals, suggests Stephen Chan, professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.
Chinese medical teams have worked in Africa since 1963, but recently their objective has expanded to include promotion of China's pharmaceuticals such as antimalarials, according to Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. He said a combination of economic interests and the need to expand its political influence and improve its international image was driving Chinese health aid in Africa.

Last summer, the then Chinese president Hu Jintao announced an expansive aid programme that will offer 18,000 government scholarships and train 30,000 Africans "in various sectors" by 2015. China advertises these programmes as a kind-hearted diplomatic gesture – the terms "equality", "all-round co-operation" and "mutual gain" pepper its state media reports and programme descriptions. Experts say they're a calculated, long-term investment to win the hearts and minds of Africa's future leaders, many of whom fear China's investment in the continent may come with invisible strings attached. Mahamat Adam, a Cameroonian business consultant and former member of the China-Africa Business Council, said "It must be understood by the Africans, they are not there to do philanthropy or help, they are there to do business. The Chinese are here to work for us, but they're here for their own interests first."

China in Africa

Navin Shah, a property developer in Kenya, stresses that the Chinese are not philanthropists, and that Chinese aid is not just a gift, but also serves to benefit the benefactor: "Ultimately, it is another imperial power pursuing its national interests." He explains "The early colonisers came to Africa with alcohol and useless gifts to lure the locals. China is doing the same with arms sales, especially to those African governments under threat owing to civil war, insurgency, or barred from obtaining weapons from traditional Western sources. In fact, no other major power has shown the same interest or muscle, or the sheer ability to cozy up to greedy African leaders,"

China's engagement with Africa is not 'new'. Its roots date back to the 1950s, when China fought the Soviet Union and the United States for Africa, which was then seen as an ideal terrain in the Cold War. Known as the "coolie trade", China focused its efforts on African mining, plantation and railway construction. The most notable being the construction of the TamZam railway between 1970 and 1975, which linked Zambia directly to Dar-es-Salaam, breaking the dependency on white-ruled Zimbabwe. It was during this period that the Sino-African relations became political. By 1978, China had established diplomatic relations with 43 African countries. At the end of the 1970s it decided to focus on its internal challenges, China's leadership forgot about Africa and  turned to outright neglect in the 1980s. The inauguration of the new leader, Deng Xiaoping, in 1978 led to a new political direction and the uncertainty of economic development in China. Economic aid to Africa was reduced, accompanied by a decline in bilateral trade. However, self-sufficiency - a central pillar of Chinese policy - could no longer be maintained in a host of vital areas including energy, forestry resources and even food production. By the end of 2011, Chinese investment in African countries totalled almost $90 billion (£55.4 billion), the third-largest recipient behind Asia and Europe. Oil is the top item imported from Angola, followed by hardwood timber from Liberia. Sudan exports two-thirds of its oil to China.

As Chinese investment in Africa increases, the emergence of small-scale Chinese retailers threatens to undermine existing local shops. In Huambo, Angola, Chinese shops have increased ten-fold, from two in 2002 to over 20 in 2006. In Oshikango, Namibia, the first Chinese shop was opened in 1999; by 2006, there were 75. The influx of Chinese trading shops has been met with a mix of enthusiasm and concern. . In South Africa, Chinese migrants are seen as intruders, even by those who buy at their shops. A street vendor in Kenya scornfully remarks: "The Chinese come here with promises of new jobs and better lifestyles, but they are taking away even the simple businesses like selling groceries. Yet, the government says we should celebrate Chinese investment?" Dipak Patel, former trade minister for Zambia: "Does Zambia need Chinese investors who sell shoes, clothes, food, chickens and eggs in our markets when the indigenous people can?" And in 2006, an opposition presidential candidate ran a "Zambia for Zambians" campaign aimed at expelling Chinese influence from his country.

There is a debate regarding China's practice of employing its own nationals. A study commissioned by the Angolan government showed that while non-Chinese employers were expected to pay between $3 (£1.85) and $4 a day to Angolan labourers, Chinese labourers were paid $1 day by their own employers. At the World Social Forum held in Nairobi, Kenya in 2007, Humphrey Pole-Pole, head of Tanzania Social Forum, declared: "First, Europe and America took our big businesses. Now China is driving our small and medium entrepreneurs to bankruptcy. You don't even contribute to employment because you bring in your own labour."

The general manager of China National Overseas Engineering Corporation, based in Lusaka, Zambia, attributes the differences to cultural barriers: "Chinese people can stand very hard work. They work until they finish and then rest. In Zambia, they are like the British; they work according to a plan. They have tea breaks and a lot of days off. For our construction company, that means that it costs a lot more."

While this low-cost model insinuates low wages, it has also become synonymous with bad working conditions, abusive practices and environmental degradation. In 2010, for example, 11 local employees of a coal mine in Sinazongwe, Zambia were sprayed with bullets by the Chinese managers while they were protesting about pay and working conditions. This followed a 2005 explosion in a Chinese copper mine in Chambishi, Zambia, which killed 46 workers. In 2007, the Nigerian government leased to China Nuclear International Uranium Company a tract of land belonging to ethnic Tuaregs, without compensating them. Legal and illegal timber logging has wreaked havoc on the prospects for sustainable forestry in Liberia and Mozambique. Dams built in Sudan and Mozambique have displaced thousands of local residents, while over-fishing off the eastern and southern African coasts has impaired communities dependant on fishing for their livelihood.

A Done Deal?

Kipawa, a district of Tanzania's Dar es Salaam, used to be a lively neighbourhood, home to about 1,300 families. Many residents had lived there for most of their lives. More than 480 families protested against a proposed compensation package that, they said, undervalued their homes by 50% and was based on an obsolete land acquisition act dating from 1967. Nevertheless, in February 2010, the eviction was carried out suddenly. Teargas was used and more than 300 buildings were demolished within two days. Many people became homeless overnight, according to the Legal and Human Rights Centre, a Tanzania-based NGO.

Now, the area has been completely demolished and fenced in. A sign on the fence says a Chinese company, China International Fund, is to construct a terminal building here as part of a project to extend the country’s main airport. It is almost two years since the community was evicted to make way for the development, and yet there are no signs of construction in Kipawa. The displacement may turn out to be pointless, since the Tanzanian government has admitted the investment for its airport projects is not yet in place. The area has become a deserted field. Most former residents were relocated 36km to the west; they no longer have access to electricity, clean water, roads or schools, and they face long journeys.

 In March 2007 Chinese businessman Sam Po flew his private jet into Tanzania. Po represents the 88 Queensway Group, a body of companies – including the China International Fund (CIF) and China Sonangol International Holding. He offered to upgrade Julius Nyerere international airport and revive Air Tanzania, the national flag-carrier. Po promised six other projects.  A few months later  China Sonangol was granted licences to explore two oilfields in the Lake Rukwa basin in south-west Tanzania. It is clear the two deals were linked. Sonangol has been granted oil concessions outside normal procedure in 2009. A year later, the parliament forced the authorities to withdraw the oil licences granted to the Chinese company.

Meanwhile, the 1,300 families evicted from Kipawa are still struggling to rebuild their lives.

 http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/03/02/chinese-investment-in-tanzania-results-in-mass-evictions/

"You'll Be Fired If You Refuse"

Chinese-run copper mines in Zambia are dangerously unsafe and owners routinely flout the rights of workers, says a report by Human Rights Watch. Chinese mines were worse than at other foreign-owned mines. Pay at the Chinese-run mines was higher than Zambia's minimum wage, but much lower than that paid by other multinational copper mining firms. Also miners are threatened with dismissal if they became involved in union activities.

"Sometimes when you find yourself in a dangerous position, they tell you to go ahead with the work," one miner told HRW. "They just consider production, not safety. If someone dies, he can be replaced tomorrow. And if you report the problem, you'll lose your job."

Miners had to work 12-hour shifts often in fume-filled tunnels. Sometimes shifts were 18 hours long. Zambian law limits shifts to eight hours. Miners in Chinese-run companies have been subject to abusive health, safety and labour conditions and longtime Zambian government indifference.

Many of the poor safety practices in Zambia's Chinese-run mines were strikingly similar to abuses at mines in China. Currently dozens of miners have been trapped in a coal mine in China. Four miners were killed and 50 more are missing after the accident, which happened late on Thursday in the city of Sanmenxia in Henan province.

Hundreds of Chinese miners die every year in pit accidents. The industry is one of the most dangerous in the world, and is notorious for its lax safety standards. Earlier this week a gas explosion at a mine in neighbouring Hunan province killed 29 people.

Chinese capitalism

Chinese investment in Zambia, Africa's leading copper producer topped $1 billion last year and came with the promise of 15,000 jobs as well as an additional $5 billion investment over the next few years. Almost all of the money went into Zambia's copper-mining industry, with only 10% invested in construction, agriculture, retail and manufacturing. In a country where almost two-thirds of the 13 million citizens live under the poverty line of $1.25 a day, economic growth is the government's priority but Zambians have begun to realize that "economic growth has not translated into significant poverty reduction," as the latest World Bank country assessment states.

Copper — responsible for 70% of Zambia's export earnings — largely contributed to the country's 7.6% economic growth in 2010. Critics complain that those revenues hardly benefit all Zambians. Unions and watchdogs note that most profits are taken out of the country instead of being reinvested in much needed infrastructure, hospitals and schools. There are also widespread allegations of Chinese firms ignoring environmental and labor laws to reap higher profits — and of the government turning a blind eye.
"The government lets Chinese investors act above the law," explains Edward Lange, coordinator of Southern Africa Resource Watch in Zambia. "Corruption is rife. We have lost control over our resources."
Tens of thousands of mine workers and their families are growing increasingly disgruntled with Chinese-run mining operations. Previous protests against low pay and poor working conditions have shown few results, only worsening tensions among workers and managers. During a strike in April, Chinese managers shot and wounded eleven protesters.
"We are discontent with the political and economic situation," confirms Charles Muchimba, research director of the Mineworkers' Union of Zambia. While Chinese investors have reaped massive profits, workers have borne the brunt of Zambia's free-market economy and suffered salary cuts of up to 40% during the recession, he says.

China is on a resource grab. Beijing doesn't do gifts; it does deals. The ambition, speed and scale of Chinese involvement in Africa is extraordinary. According to Chris Alden, author of China in Africa, two-way trade stood at $10 billion in 2000. By 2006, it was $55 billion, and in 2009 it hit $90 billion, making China Africa's single largest trading partner, supplanting the U.S., which did $86 billion in trade with Africa in 2009. Today the Chinese are pumping oil from Sudan to Angola, logging from Liberia to Gabon, mining from Zambia to Ghana and farming from Kenya to Zimbabwe. Chinese contractors are building roads from Equatorial Guinea to Ethiopia, dams from the Congo to the Nile, and hospitals and schools, sports stadiums and presidential palaces across the continent. They are buying too. Acquisitions range from a $5.5 billion stake in South Africa's Standard Bank to a $14 million investment in a mobile-phone company in Somalia. What's happening is a new scramble for Africa.

THE CHAINS TIGHTEN

China’s attraction to Africa is clear. Africa has great promise. It is well known that Africa is rich in a wide variety of minerals from oil to copper. Africa’s vast amount of land could fit the entire land mass of not only China but also India, the United States, Mexico, France, Italy and a number of other countries. Besides land, and more importantly, Africa has huge resources of water essential for bountiful harvests. China’s burgeoning economy is demanding more and more natural mineral resources whether it is oil, copper, nickel or gold. The demands of China’s more sophisticated diets means that imports of food is increasing as well. Africa’s exports to China are about 80 per cent raw materials like oil but increasingly it is also manufactured and agricultural such as Egyptian oranges, South African wines, Ghana’s cocoa beans, Ugandan coffee, Tunisian olive oil and more.

China is now Africa’s largest trading partner. Visit any shopping centre in any country in Africa and it is clear that China is flooding Africa with consumer goods, machinery, automobiles and electronic items. China has bilateral trade agreements with 45 African countries. Investment from China into Africa between 2003 and 2009 grew from $490 million to $9,300 billion.

http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/-/539546/1172524/-/nf8bog/-/

China versus Miners

Zambian miners at the Collum Coal Mine are furious with their Chinese bosses. At least 11 miners were allegedly shot by two Chinese managers during a protest about poor conditions in October.

The southern rural district of Sinazongwe is covered in black coal dust, but otherwise there is not a hint that the 21st Century has reached the area. And this is what has angered the miners. They feel that while the Chinese benefit from the mine and live comfortably, they remain in poverty often renting mud-walled huts lacking basic facilities. There is also perception that the Chinese management has little concern for their workers' safety. They lack face masks, safety shoes and in many instances wear their own clothes in the course of duty.

"The salaries are a problem - we get 500,000 kwacha ($100; £63) a month but our rentals cost about 100,000 kwacha ($20; £13)," says miner Ngula Simukuka, who has a wife and four children to support in nearby Sinazeze township.

The nearby Sikalima stream is another cause of friction between the Chinese-run mine and the cattle-herding community in the area, who rely on it as a source of drinking water. The stream now carries black sediment of waste coal which eventually flows into Lake Kariba.

Elijah Muchima, minister for the area, recently visited the mine and had heated words with the Collum Coal Mine Director Xu Jian Rui.
"You are using labour and you should pay for it adequately," Mr Muchima said."Your investment is important but our labour is more important. If you find that business is not profitable, close it down. Other people will come. If it's not profitable, go away. If it's not profitable, you would not have been here for nine years."

The mine director attributed his company's poor pay to problems it faces in marketing its coal.
"Our clients are mainly Zambian copper mines but sometimes they import coal from Zimbabwe," Mr Xu answered, speaking through an interpreter.

Last year China invested more than $400m (£250m) in Zambia's mining industry, which is one of the major employers in the private sector. So for th government a balance needs to be struck between attracting investment and protecting the interests of the locals.Collum currently produces an average of 150,000 metric tonnes of coal, which earns the mine up to $6m (£4m) a year.

A temporary wage deal was struck until negotiations between the mine and the workers' union conclude. Miners will now get a minimum of $90 (£57) a month, but will also be entitled to monthly housing and transport allowances totalling $57 (£36).

China has massively expanded its economic ties to countries across Africa in recent years. Wikileaks recently released details of US diplomatic cables that accused China of being "...a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals...China is not in Africa for altruistic reasons...China is in Africa primarily for China."

Oil out - Guns in

Chinese and African Perspectives on China in Africa. Eds Axel Harneit-Sievers, Stephen Marks and Sanusha Naidu, Pambazuka Press £16.95. (Also available as an e-book from www.fahamubooks.org)

There may be a prevalent view of Africa as a continent immersed in poverty, but in fact it is rich in many things, minerals and energy for instance. Efforts by the wealthiest and most powerful countries to exploit these resources have carried on since the end of classical colonialism and the coming of ‘independence’, and these have helped ensure the continuation of poverty for the vast majority of Africans. As China joins the club of developed capitalist states, it also sees Africa as a source of raw materials and a market for exports. This volume gives a wide-ranging overview of China’s activities in Africa, with chapters by activists and academics from both China and Africa. Almost without exception, the most interesting essays are those by African authors, with those by Chinese contributors being largely bland and uncritical.

Bilateral trade between China and Africa has increased over the last decade to more than $US100 billion. As Chinese capitalism expands, it needs to import raw materials of various kinds, and nearly 80 percent of China’s imports from Africa are oil and petroleum products. For instance, 500,000 barrels of oil are exported to China from Angola each day, and it is only Chinese companies, with mainly Chinese employees, who carry out this work, so Chinese industry benefits from both the oil and the extraction work. Furthermore, China is a major producer of wood and paper products, but has relatively little by way of forestry resources, hence Chinese companies undertake logging in Mozambique and Tanzania. Minerals such as iron ore, copper and uranium are imported to China from Liberia, Zambia and Niger.

At the same time, China exports finished goods to Africa. In Nigeria, for example, cheap Chinese textiles have undercut domestically-produced goods, increasing local unemployment. Chinese companies export cheap, and sometimes dangerous, goods aimed specifically at the African market, where consumers have little money to spend. Arms sales from China to Africa are also an important source of profits, with Sudan, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe among the purchasers.

The book contains a few pointless policy ideas, such as the African Union playing a larger role in supervising Sino-African relations. Its usefulness lies elsewhere, in showing the extent to which China is acting in essentially the same way as the other capitalist powers, and how the workers and peasants of Africa remain subject to the exploitation and oppression of both ‘home-grown’ and global rulers.
PB

Book Review from November issue of the Socialist Standard

Chinese profits in Africa

THE boom in China's investments in Africa over the past 17 years was driven more by simple profit motives than complex political and strategic considerations, an academic and government spokesman said .

Zhong Jianhua, China's ambassador to SA, said during a debate at the Gordon Institute of Business Science in Johannesburg to mark the launch of the China Africa Network, that if business investments were made for political reasons, they would hardly be sustainable."I wish I could give political instructions to business people. There may be some cases where people come here for political considerations but most business people come to SA, as in any part of the world, without political motivation..."

Last month the Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University circulated an article warning that China's expanding interests in Africa threatened the environmental, economic and political stability of African society. Last year China became SA's biggest trading partner.

china expands

A senior Chinese naval officer has suggested that China establish a permanent base in the Gulf of Aden . Rear Admiral Yin Zhou's proposal was posted on the defence ministry website.Yin said supplying and maintaining the fleet off Somalia was challenging without such a base.The Chinese navy has already been patrolling the Gulf of Aden for more than a year. China's navy currently has no overseas bases, but there are calls in the media and web forums for this to change.

African oil and minerals are vital for the country's economy.