In April, Burundi’s President Pierre Nkurunziza, in power
since 2005, announced he’d be running for a third term in elections scheduled
for June. Opposition supporters, church leaders, student and civil society
groups, much of the international community, and even many in Nkurunziza’s own
party say this violates the Arusha agreement, which limits a president to two
terms in office.
Thousands of Burundians took to the streets to protest
Nkurunziza’s plans to run for office again. Hundreds were arrested and perhaps
twenty—the number is disputed—were killed. Security forces were split, with
some in the army on the side of the people. On May 13, a group of army officers
led by former intelligence chief Godefroid Niyombare announced they’d ousted
Nkurunziza, to much rejoicing in Bujumbura. Nkurunziza who was in Tanzania
discussing the crisis with other African leaders, quickly sneaked back across
the border where he was met by his own forces and retook the capital a couple
of days later.
Nkurunziz isa former warlord who became a born-again
Christian and travels with his own Hallelujah football club and choir—of
presiding over a regime of corruption remarkable even by East African standards.
Many also claim President Nkurunziza has condoned politically motivated
killings of opposition figures and provided tacit government support to an
armed militia known as Imbonerakure, which could be deployed to intimidate
voters during the election. Niyombare is said to be on the run, and most of his
fellow coup plotters have been arrested. Three who were wounded were
subsequently shot in their hospital beds by men in police uniforms as horrified
nurses, doctors, and other patients looked on. An estimated hundred thousand
refugees have fled to neighboring countries. Nkurunziza seems determined to go
ahead with his plans to stand for reelection. Radio France Internationale
reported that police in Bujumbura had cordoned off an entire neighborhood and
were shooting at anti-third term activists among their homes.
In their new book 'Africa Uprising', Adam Branch and Zachariah
Mampilly document more than ninety political protests in forty African
countries in the past decade—most in the past six years. Many have had the same
aim as those in the Middle East: to force corrupt leaders out of power. After
Senegal’s Constitutional Court ruled that President Abdoulaye Wade could run
for what many maintained was an unconstitutional third term in the 2012
elections, people poured onto the streets in outrage. Police in riot gear fired
tear gas and rubber bullets, and a handful of protesters were killed. But the
country’s citizens got their point across. Wade lost the election and conceded
defeat. In Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré tried to strong-arm the
National Assembly into removing term limits so he could contest the 2015
election, hundreds of thousands of people gathered in front of the building
while some forced their way in. He was deposed in October 2014, and an interim
military council is now organizing elections to take place later this year. And
when demonstrators in the Democratic Republic of Congo took to the streets of
Kinshasa in January, they managed to halt President Joseph Kabila’s attempt to
alter the constitution, which would have extended his term beyond its end date
of 2016. Over two dozen African countries are headed for elections in the next
two years, including Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and other countries
whose leaders have signaled an intention to remain in office no matter what.
Protest movements in some of these countries are gathering force, and army
commanders are quietly choosing sides between the autocrats and the people.
But why do so many African leaders assume they can ignore
their constitutions, cling to power, and get away with it?
Western aid pays for half of Burundi’s budget, roughly 40
percent of Rwanda’s, 50 percent of Ethiopia’s and 30 percent of Uganda’s . All
these countries receive an unknown amount of military aid as well. This money
enables African leaders to ignore the demands of their own people, and
facilitates the financing of the patronage systems and security machinery that
keeps them in power.
African countries that had borrowed and spent lavishly in
the years following independence found themselves unable to repay the
commercial banks that had lent them money. The Western nations, via the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund, took over and restructured these loans,
but demanded large public spending cuts. Huge numbers of teachers, nurses,
doctors, and other public servants lost their jobs; programs to expand health
care and education, improve roads and bring water and electricity to rural
areas ground to a halt; poverty deepened; infant mortality rose.
In many cases, the new austerity programs, intended to lead
to more efficient government, instead encouraged unprecedented corruption.
Those who managed to hold on to government and civil service jobs scrambled to
grab whatever they could for themselves and their increasingly dependent
extended families. This patronage system helped control dissent, as many
African leaders used what Cameroonians term “the politics of the
belly”—bribery—to compromise their critics and coopt opposition groups. But it
also led to deteriorating public services where for example the maternal
mortality rate in Uganda’s largest referral hospital has increased seven-fold
since the days of Idi Amin.
Foreign aid donors
were not oblivious to these problems. They knew that this new loan regime,
known as Structural Adjustment, would hurt huge numbers of people. For example,
in a notorious 1981 World Bank report about the program , the authors
acknowledge that some reforms would be resisted by “consumers and producers,
parasitical managers, civil servants and industrialists,”—meaning just about
everybody in the nations involved. The state had to be “willing to take strong
action on internal problems,” the report continued. As Branch and Mampilly
note, many African scholars interpreted this as tacit donor permission for
repression in countries receiving loans. This would be consistent with the
donors’ tendency to look the other way when Adjustment-friendly leaders—like
Burkina Faso’s Compaoré, Cote D’Ivoire’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Uganda’s
Museveni and Kenya’s Daniel Arap Moi—jailed, murdered, or exiled their critics.
The donors’ tolerance for human rights abuses may help explain why, when ethnic
discrimination and repression escalated into genocide, as it did in Rwanda and
Burundi, the international community did nothing until it was far too late.
Another reason so many African leaders feel they can afford
to ignore their own people has to do with America’s “War on Terror.” During the
1990s, the Clinton administration began securing military ties with African
leaders who seemed willing to cooperate in the fight against what Clinton
officials saw as the rising threat of Islamic militancy on the continent. These
ties have only grown in the years after September 11. According to journalist
Nick Turse, the US military has sponsored more than one thousand African
missions since 2011, with countries such as Nkurunziza’s Burundi, along with
Rwanda, Ethiopia, Chad, and Uganda, deploying troops and guards across Africa
and the Middle East at America’s behest. The primary purpose of this seems to
be to monitor and prevent the emergence of terrorist groups in weak states. But
it’s no coincidence that the US’s military allies in Africa have often used
security forces against their own critics at home. As the events in Burundi
suggest, providing support to ugly regimes may ultimately undermine the very
stability we are supposedly seeking.
Now, fed up with decades of lies, plunder and abuse,
Africans across the continent are finally rising up to challenge these
Western-backed thugs. Some have been inspired by protests elsewhere in the
world; some are united in new ways by Facebook, Twitter, and chat programs.
Foreign aid has also brought thousands of NGOs into Africa. Not all are
effective, but their American and European employees and volunteers have,
naively or not, exposed African people to liberal Western attitudes and ideals
of human rights as never before. Previous African protest movements had clear
ideologies, like Independence, African Nationalism and Pan-Africanism, the only
thing today’s protesters appear to want is the removal of the current
leadership of their countries. But this lack of a grand objective may not be
such a bad thing, as long as whoever takes over pursues a modest program of
obeying the rule of law, eschewing corruption and respecting human rights.
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